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ADMINISTRATIVE INCONVENIENCE
AND THE MEDIA'S RIGHT TO
COPY JUDICIAL RECORDS
Abstract: English and American common law have long recognized the pub-
lic's right of access to judicial records. The United States Supreme Court has
acknowledged the importance of this right but has failed to set clear stan-
dards for lower courts to follow in evaluating right-of-access claims. This Note
explores the disagreement among the federal courts of appeals regarding
the appropriate scope of review in right-of-access cases and the force of the
presumption in favor of access. This Note argues that federal appellate
courts should not limit review to abuse of discretion, but should evaluate the
balancing the lower court performed and determine if the lower court ap-
propriately weighed the competing interests in making its decision. This
Note concludes that the presumption in favor of access should yield more
readily to constitutional concerns than to administrative concerns. Reason-
able constitutional concerns would therefore trump the common-law right of
access, whereas administrative concerns must be compelling to overcome the
presumption favoring access.
INTRODUCTION
The public has long enjoyed access to judicial and other public
records under English and American common law.' In 1978, the Su-
preme Court of the United States recognized a presumption in favor
of this common -law right in Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc. 2 The
Court, however, did not delineate the relative strength of this pre-
sumption and therefore failed to provide guidance to lower courts in
deciding right-of-access cases.3 Following Warner Communications, fed-
eral appellate courts disagreed about the appropriate scope of review
' See Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597-98 (1978); United
States v Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1257-58 (D.C. Cir. 1976), 'mid sub nom. Warner Communi-
cations, 435 U.S. 589; Nowack v. Fuller, 219 N.W. 749, 750-51 (Mich. 1928); Ferry v. Wil-
liams, 91 MIL. 332, 339 (Sup. Ct. 1879); William 011ie Key, Jr., Note, The Common Law
Right to Inspect and Copy judicial Records: In Camera or on Camera, 16 GA. L. REV. 659, 661-69
(1982).
2 435 U.S. at 602.
See id.
1263
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in right-of-access cases and the force of the presumption in favor of
access. 4
 The Supreme Court has yet to resolve this disagreement. 5
Courts have generally weighed the presumption favoring access
against constitutional concerns, primarily the defendant's right to a
fair tria1. 6
 Technological advancements, however, are implicating ad-
ministrative concerns, such as difficulty of reproduction, that also
weigh against the media's right of access.? As a result of these ad-
vancements, courts have extended the right of access to audio- and
videotaped exhibits and, recently, to electronic exhibits. 8 The media
or public, however, may be unable to reproduce computer-displayed
electronic exhibits.9
 As courtroom technology progresses, courts
should develop standards to resolve the conflict between right-of-
access claims and administrative difficulties of reproduction. 10
Part I of this Note surveys the common-law history of the public's
physical right of access to inspect and copy judicial records." It details
the English origins of the common-law right and the American com-
mon-law adoption of that right that has extended to audio- and video-
taped and electronic evidence." Part II explores the contours of the
right of physical access, which the Supreme Court broadly defined in
Warner Communications." Part III examines the federal appellate deci-
sions that follow Warner Communications. It focuses on the standard of
review and the strength of the presumption the federal courts of ap-
peals have adopted in favor of the media's access to documents." In
conclusion, Part IV proposes an appropriate standard of review in
right-of-access cases and suggests that the relative strength of the pre-
sumption favoring access depends on the nature of competing con-
cerns. 18
See, e.g., Belo Broad. Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423, 434 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Criden (In re Nat'l Broad. Co.), 648 F.2d 814, 822-23 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. Myers
(In re Nat'l Broad. Co.), 635 F.2d 945, 952 (2d Cir. 1980).
5 See In re Providence journal Co., 293 F.3d 1, 16 (1st Cir. 2002).
6
 See, e.g., Belo, 654 F.2d at 431; Criden, 648 F.2d at 826-27; Myers, 635 F.2d at 953.
7
 See Providence Jou rnal, 293 F.3d at 17; Valley Broad. Co. v. United States Dist. Court for
the Dist. of Nev., 798 F.2d 1289, 1295 (9th Cir. 1986).
See Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 599; Provideneefournal, 293 F.3d at 17.
9 See Providence Journal, 293 F.3d at 17-18.
i° See infra notes 235-314 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 16-49 and accompanying text.
12
 See infra notes 16-49 and accompanying text.
13
 See infra notes 50-96 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 97-234 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 235-315 and accompanying text.
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I. COMMON LAW HISTORY OF THE RIGHT OF ACCESS
The common-law right of access to judicial records arose in four-
teenth-century England.'° Prior to 1372, English law limited the pub-
lic's right of access to protect the king, 17 Courts would not allow an
opponent of the king to inspect or copy records that aided suits
against the king or hindered prosecutions in his name. 18 In 1372, Par-
liament expanded the right of access to copy and inspect all judicial
records, including those that could potentially harm the king."
English courts limited this expanded right of access, however, to
members of the public who had a proprietary interest in, or a particu-
lar need for, a document involved in a lawsuit." The restriction did
not deny access, but it limited the , public's remedy to enforce the right
of access. 21 If a court denied a citizen's request for access, the citizen
could only enforce that right if the attorney general filed mandamus
proceedings on the individual's behalf. 22 English law initially limited
this writ to cases implicating the sovereign or public interest. 23 Later,
the law allowed a private individual who could show a particularized
interest in the material, different from that of the general public, to
file a writ of mandamus in his or her own name. 24
 Although every citi-
zen had the right to inspect documents, courts generally would not
enforce this right unless the individual had an interest in current or
future litigation. 25
American courts have historically allowed the public to examine
and reproduce public and judicial documents, without requiring a
specific interest in the records." One American court saw the denial
of public access to judicial records as "repugnant to the spirit of our
democratic institutions."27 Courts allowed individuals to access public
records for the public interest and did not limit the right to individu-
als with private interests in pending suits."
18 Key, supra note 1, at 661-62.
17 See id. at 661.
18 Id.
19 Id.
28 Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978),
21 See Nowack v. Fuller, 219 N.W. 749, 751 (Mich. 1928).
22 Id.
23 Id,
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 597-98; see Key, supra note 1, at 668.
27 Nowack, 219 N.W. at 750.
28 See id. at 751; Ferry v. Williams, 41 N.J.L. 331, 339 (Sup. Ct. 1879).
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For example, in 1879, in Ferry v. Williams, the Supreme Court of
New Jersey granted an individual access to letters on file with the
Town of Orange because the individual believed town officials were
not enforcing provisions for licensing saloons.23 A town ordinance
required any person who wanted to sell ale to file a letter of recom-
mendation, signed by six legal voters and freeholders, "to the effect
that the applicant was of good moral character and of good repute for
temperance."3° The petitioner sought access to the records because
he believed that the town did not obey the requirements regarding
the letters. 31
 The court granted the individual access to the docu-
ments because he acted in his private interest as an affected citizen,
and for the public convenience, to prevent wrongs by pUblic
officials. 32
The Supreme Court of New Jersey noted that many American
courts and a number of English courts did not observe the general
English rule requiring the attorney general to maintain a suit to re-
dress public wrongs if an individual did not have a particularized in-
terest.33 American courts liberalized this rule, in accordance with the
"more democratic character of our institutions." 34 Following Ferry,
American courts have generally granted access to an individual who
wants to inspect records in furtherance of the public interest, particu-
larly when related to the redress of wrongs by public officials. 35
Similarly, in 1929, in Nowack v. Fuller, the Michigan Supreme
Court rejected the English requirement that allowed an individual to
inspect judicial documents only if the documents related to current
or potential litigation.38
 According to the Michigan Supreme Court,
English law did not fully protect a citizen's right of access because the
court would not issue a writ of mandamus unless an individual wanted
to use records in defending or pursuing litigation. 37 The court rea-
soned that this limited remedy did not protect an individual's rights. 38
The court accordingly granted the plaintiff, as a citizen and taxpayer,
29
 41 N.J.L. at 333-34.339.
3° Id. at 333.
31
 Id. at 333-34.
32 Id. at 339.
" See id. at 336-39.
34
 Ferry, 41 N.J.L. at 337.
35 See Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 597-98; Nowack, 219 N.W. at 751.
36 219 N.W. at 751.
37 Id.
39
 See id.
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access to public records to determine if the state had properly ex-
pended public money. 39
American courts have thus found general public interest, such as
the desire to monitor public agencies, sufficient to justify public ac-
cess to judicial records.° Courts have reasoned that access to public
records, including judicial records, increases public understanding of,
and encourages confidence in, government and the judicial process. 41
Access to judicial proceedings enables education of the public about
the judicial process and allows the public to monitor the conduct of
government officials involved in a tria1. 42
 Additionally, the openness
that access fosters is a check on the integrity of the judicial process
and helps insure that a defendant receives a fair trial." Although the
news media further these policies by broadcasting material to people
unable to attend trials, the media do not enjoy a right of access
greater than that of the general public.44
American courts initially limited the right of access to judicial
records to the right to hand copy written trial records, such as tran-
scripts, exhibits, and pleadings.° The availability of photocopying and
recording equipment facilitated access to other types of evidence and
compelled courts to examine how much access they should grant the
public, particularly the media.° Courts extended the right of access to
accommodate technological advancements such as audio- and video-
tape recordings, as well as eleCtronic exhibits. 47 These technological
advancements have caused courts to question the scope of the com-
mon-law right-of-access requirement in determining if a court must
provide copies of materials that may not be easily reproduced.° This
39 Id.
40 See Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 597-98; Nowack, 219 N.W. at 751; Ferry, 41
N.J.L. at 339.
41 See Lisa Kakaty Starczewski, Note, Media Access to Tape-Recorded Evidence in Criminal
Trials, 32 Vit.L. L. REV. 183, 189 (1987).
42 See David Marburger, Note, In Defense of Broadcaster Access to Evidentiary Video and
Audio Tapes, 44 U. Prrr. L. REV. 647, 650-51 (1983).
42 See id. at 651; Starczewski, supra note 41, at 189.
44 See Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 609; Belo Broad. Corp. v. Clark, 659 F.2d 423,
427 (5th Cir. 1981).
48 See Alan Evan Marder, Note, The Common Law Right of Access to Taped Evidence, 50
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 465, 466 (1982).
46 See United States v. Myers (In re Nat'l Broad. Co.), 635 F.2d 945, 950 (2d Cir. 1980);
Starczewski, supra note 41, at 190-91.
42 See Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 599; In re Providence Journal Co., 293 F.3d 1,
17 (1st Cir. 2002).
48 See Providence Journal, 293 F.3d at 17.
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question remains unresolved, largely because the Supreme Court has
failed to set a clear standard that lower courts could use to evaluate
the media's right of access. 45
IL LACK OF GUIDANCE FROM THE SUPREME COURT
Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc. is the only case in which the
Supreme Court of the United States directly addressed the media's
right to copy evidentiary recordings under the right of access. 5° In
1978, in Warner Communications, the Court reviewed and reversed the
opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit in United States v. Mitchell.m The federal court of appeals in
Mitchell had granted media outlets access to the audiotapes presented
in the Watergate trials, based on the well-settled common-law right of
access. 52 In Warner Communications, the Supreme Court reversed this
decision on statutory grounds, holding that the Presidential Record-
ings Act exclusively directed the procedure for releasing the tapes to
the public.53
 Although the Supreme Court reversed the decision in
Mitchell, the Court did not overrule the D.C. Circuit's evaluation of
the strength of the common-law right of access or its method of
evaluating a lower court's decision in a right-of-access claim. 54
A. Denial of Access Only When justice So Requires
In Mitchell, the D.C. Circuit held that the common-law right of
access outweighed both potential prejudice to the criminal defen-
dants at a possible retrial and President Nixon's privacy claim. 55
 The
court reversed the decision of the U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia denying media access to audiotapes relating to the Wa-
tergate scandal that had been played at the criminal trials of President
Nixon's top aides.56 The trial court decided that it could not release
4° See James K. Foster, Note, Constitutional Law—Assessing the Media's Right: Copying
Audio and Video Tapes Played as Evidence in Criminal Trials, 10 W. NEW Eno. L. REV. 99, 131
(1988).
5°
 See435 U.S. 589,595-97,610-11 (1978); Foster, supra note 49, at 99.
51 Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 595-97, 610-11; United States v. Mitchell, 551
F.2d 1252, 1261-65 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rety'd sub nom. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. 589.
52 See Mitchell, 551 F.2d at 1263-65.
'5 435 U.S. at 603.
54 See id. at 602-03.
55 See 551 F.2d at 1261-65.
56 Id. at 1255. For discussions of Mitchell, see Foster, supra note 49, at 102-05; Mar-
burger, supra note 42, at 653-54; Marder, supra note 45, at 472-73.
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the tapes until the aides' pending appeals were completed. 57
 The
prosecution had played admissible and relevant portions of the tapes
and introduced them into evidence. 68 The trial court. gave people at-
tending the trial earphones, with which to listen to the tapes in court,
and transcripts of the tapes, which the media were allowed to keep
and reprint. 59 The media moved at trial for permission to copy and
broadcast the tapes that had been introduced into evidence. 69 The
court granted the motion but determined that the media could not
make copies until the aides' appeals ended."
The Mitchell court recognized a well-settled and "precious" com-
mon-law right to inspect and copy public, including judicial, rec-
ords.62 The court stated that this right is indispensable to a demo-
cratic state and "predates the Constitution itself."65
 The court also
traced the history of the right, noting that American courts have re-
jected its curtailment and "granted all taxpayers and citizens access to
public records."" Concealing court records would be "'inconsistent
with the common understanding of what belongs to a public court of
record, to which all persons have the right of access.'" 65 The court
held, therefore, that the right to inspect judicial records is part. of the
right of access to public records. 66
According to Mitchell, a court has discretion regarding access be-
cause of the inability to set bright-line standards for granting access. 67
This discretion is limited.68
 A trial court may only restrict the media's
fundamental common-law right of access when 'justice so requires." 69
In Mitchell, the trial court erroneously required the networks to pro-
vide a compelling justification for access." The trial court, according
to Mitchell, should have placed the burden on Nixon and the defen-
dants to prove that justice demanded prohibiting media access to the
57 Mitchell, 551 F.2d at 1255.
58 Id.
59 Id.
69 Id.
61 Id.
82 Sec551 F.2d at 1257-60.
83 Id. at 1260.
84 Id. at 1257.
65 Id. at 1258 (quoting Ex Parte Drawbaugh, 2 App. D.C. 404,407 (1894)).
66 1d.
87 551 F.2d at 1260.
68 See id. at 1260-61.
69 Id. at 1260.
79 Id. at 1261.
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records." Based on this standard, the D.C. Circuit determined that
the trial court abused its discretion in denying access to the audio-
tapes until the aides' appeals were decided. 72
 The D.C. Circuit found
that the President's privacy claims and the potential risk of prejudice
at a second trial were not compelling enough interests to interfere
with the media's established right to inspect and copy the audio-
tapes.73
 Because the court already played the tapes at trial and the
media widely circulated the transcripts, it was unlikely that potential
jurors for a retrial would be biased by release of the tapes. 74 Justice
therefore did not require that the trial court deny access. 75
B. A Presumption, However Gauged, in Favor of Access
In 1978, in Warner Communications, the U.S. Supreme Court re-
versed the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit in Mitchell.76
 The Court reviewed the parties' compet-
ing interests, but did not weigh those interests because the Court
resolved the case based on a controlling statute. 77
 The Court deter-
mined that the Presidential Recordings Act governed the processing
and release of historically significant presidential materials, including
the andiotapes in question. 78
Although the Supreme Court decided Warner Communications on
statutory grounds, the Court recognized in dicta the public's and the
media's common-law rights of access to judicial records. 79 The Court
acknowledged the existence of a presumption for the common-law
right of access, but failed to clarify a standard under which lower
courts should evaluate the right. 80 The Court noted that the common-
law right of access to judicial records is "[aln infrequent subject of
litigation," and that "its contours have not been delineated with any
71 See id.
72
 See Mitchell, 551 F.2d at 1255, 1261.
73 Id, at 1261, 1263.
74
 Id. at 1262.
73 See id. at 1263-64.
78 Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 610-11.
77 Id, at 603.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 597, 602. For discussions of Warner Communications, see Foster, supra note 49, at
105-09; Marburger, supra note 42, at 654-55; Donna R. Moliere, Note, The Common Law
Right of Public Access When Audio and Video Tape Evidence in a Court Record Is Sought for Pur-
poses of Copying and Dissemination to the Public, 28 Loy. L. REV. 163, 167-68 (1982).
80 Sec Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 602.
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precision."81 Significantly, the Court also extended the right of access
from documents to tape recordings.82
As the D.C. Circuit held in Mitchell, the Court stated that the de-
cision regarding access is a matter of discretion for the trial court, "to
be exercised in light of the relevant facts and circumstances of the
particular case."85 The Court. decided the case on statutory grounds,
based on the Presidential Recording Act, and therefore did not estab-
lish the extent to which it would review a lower court's decision grant-
ing or denying access. 8I As in Mitchell, the Court noted, however, that
it would weigh the parties' competing interests, "in light of the public
interest and the duty of the courts," were it to evaluate the trial court's
findings.85
The Court then listed the factors to consider in such a balancing
of interests. 88 Increased public understanding of the Watergate scan-
dal was a factor favoring releasing the tapes. 87 The Court also recog-
nized the existence of a "presumption—however gauged—in favor of
public access to judicial records."88 Factors weighing against the right
of access included infringement on Nixon's privacy rights and the
role the courts would play in commercializing the tapes. 89 Although
the Court delineated these factors, it did not balance them because it
found that the Presidential Recordings Act restricted public access to
the tapes.8°
The Court declined to recognize a constitutional basis in the First
or Sixth Amendment for the media's common-law right of access,
holding that these amendments did not require release of the tapes. 91
Under the First Amendment, the media's right to information is equi-
valent to that of the general public. 92 A denial of access does not im-
plicate a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial, either,
81 Id. at 597.
82 Id. at 599.
83 Id.; see Mitchell, 551 F.2d at 1260; Marburger, supra note 42, at 654-55.
84 See Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 603.
85 Id. at 602; see Mitchell, 551 F.2d at 1261-63 (weighing the factors favoring and oppos-
ing access).
88 Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 602-03.
87 See id. at 602.
Bs Id.
88 Id, at 600-02.
59
 See id. at 603.
81 Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 608.
92 See id. at 609.
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because the public and media may attend and report on the proceed-
gs.95
The Supreme Court failed in Warner Communications to define the
scope of the right of access. 94
 The Court did not set a standard that
trial courts could use to evaluate a right-of-access claim to copy or in-
spect evidence; the Court instead set vague guidelines for federal ap-
pellate courts to follow when reviewing a trial court's decisions. 95 Al-
though the Supreme Court recognized the existence of a presump-
tion in favor of the common-law right of access, the Court refused to
acknowledge a constitutional basis for that presumption.96
III. CIRCUIT SPLIT: STRENGTH OF THE PRESUMPTION
IN FAVOR OF ACCESS
Following the decision in Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc.,
the federal courts of appeals have disagreed on the strength of the
presumption in favor of access when they balanced the factors in a
right-of-access determination. 97
 Courts have varied in their interpreta-
tions of the Supreme Court's recognition in Warner Communications, in
dicta, of a presumption, "however gauged," in favor of access to public
records. 95 In 1980, in United States v. Myers (In re National Broadcasting
Co.), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit determined
that "only the most compelling circumstances" can overcome a strong
presumption in favor of access. 99 Alternatively, in 1981, in Belo Broad-
casting Corp. v. Clark, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
determined that a number of factors can defeat the relatively weak
presumption in favor of the common-law right of access. 100 In 1981, in
United States v. Crider. (In re National Broadcasting Co.), and in 1986, in
Valley Broadcasting Co. v. United States District Court for the District of Ne-
vada, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Third and Ninth Circuits, re-
" Id. at 610.
" See id. at 602-03.
" See id.
96
 Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 602, 608.
97 See, e.g., Belo Broad. Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423, 434 (5th Cir. 1981); United States
v. Criden (In re Nat'l Broad. Co.), 648 F.2d 814, 822-23 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v.
Myers (In re Nat'l Broad. Co.), 635 F.2d 945, 952 (2d Cir. 1980). See generally Starczewski,
supra note 41, at 185-87.
" 435 U.S. 589, 602 (1978); see Valley Broad. Co. v. United States Dist. Court for the
Dist. of Nev., 798 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1986); Belo, 654 F.2d at 434; Criden, 648 F.2d at
822-23; Myers, 635 F.2d at 952.
99 635 F.2d at 952.
1 " 654 F.2d at 434.
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spectively, created an intermediate standard. 101 These courts found a
strong presumption favoring public access to judicial records, but al-
lowed less-than-compelling circumstances to overcome that presump-
tion. 102 The Supreme Court has not yet resolved this disagreement
among the federal courts of appeals. 103
A. Tipping the Scales in Favor of Access
In Myers, the Second Circuit found that only extraordinary cir-
cumstances could outweigh the strong presumption in favor of ac-
cess.'" Because the Supreme Court did not set a standard for evaluat-
ing the right of access, the Second Circuit struggled to find guidance
in balancing the competing rights of the media and the defendant. 1133
In Myers, the media wanted to copy videotapes revealing illegal deal-
ings (the "Abscam" operation), including bribery, between under-
cover FBI operatives and the criminal defendants, who were members
of Congress and other public officials. 106 In the courtroom of the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of New York, members of the
media and general public viewed videotaped evidence of illegal trans-
actions. 107 The court gave the jury and the media transcripts of the
tapes, and as the jury viewed the tapes, media artists sketched the
video images.'" The media publicized these transcripts and sketches
throughout the trial. 103
The media applied to the court for permission to copy the tapes
by connecting a wire from the courtroom video equipment to the
media's equipment while the prosecutor presented them to the
jury."° This method, according to the court, would not disturb the
trial. 111 The trial court granted the request, allowing the copying to
occur at the close of each trial clay. 112 The court noted that, absent "a
101 See Valley, 798 F.2d at 1299; Criden, 648 F.2d at 822-23.
102 See Valley, 798 F.2d at 1294; Criden, 648 F.2d at 822-23.
105 See In re Providence Journal Co., 293 F.3d 1, 16-17 (1st Cir. 2002). See generally
Starczewski, supra note 41, at 187.
104
 635 F.2d at 952.
1 °5 See id. at 951-52.
1°8 Id. at 947.
107 Id. at 947, 948.
108 Id. at 948.
10° Myers, 635 F.2d at 948.
no Id.
111 Id.
112 Id. at 948-49.
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strong showing of reasons why they should not be made available,"
the court should provide the tapes to the media."
In reviewing the trial court's decision, the Second Circuit relied
on the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit in United States v. Mitchell.'" Although the Supreme
Court reversed Mitchell on statutory grounds in Warner Communica-
tions, the Second Circuit noted that the D.C. Circuit's opinion was a
significant evaluation of the common-law right of access and re-
mained "strong authority" for the media's right to copy videotaped
evidence. 115
The Second Circuit also cited Supreme Court decisions that gen-
erally addressed the competing values involved in evaluating the right
of access. 118 Opposing the right of access are the right of the defen-
dant to a fair trial and the obligation of the court to refrain from co-
operating with the media in a manner that would impede that
right."? Favoring the right of access is the public interest in knowing
what occurs in the courtroom." 8
Considering these competing concerns, the Second Circuit fol-
lowed the lead of the D.C. Circuit in Mitchell. 119 The Second . Circuit
concluded that when evidence "is in a form that readily permits sight
and sound reproduction," only "the most extraordinary circum-
stances" could justify limiting the general public's opportunity to ob-
serve the evidence.'" The presumption favors access if the media can
copy the evidence "without any significant risk of impairing the integ-
rity of the evidence or interfering with the orderly conduct of the
trial." In such circumstances, particularly if the evidence reveals ac-
tions of public officials, "only the most compelling circumstances
should prevent contemporaneous public access" to the taped evi-
d en ce. 122
The initial determination regarding access, according to the Sec-
ond Circuit's interpretation of the Supreme Court's dicta in Warner
Communications, is within the "informed discretion" of the trial
"8 Id. at 949.
114 See Myers, 635 F.2d a t 950-51.
"5 Id.
118 See id. at 951.
'" Id.
"8 1d.
"8 Myers, 635 F.2d at 952.
t2o
121 Id.
"n Id.
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court."' This standard of review for the lower court decision is more
stringent than just abuse of discretion."4 The federal court of appeals
must find that the lower court carefully evaluated the competing in-
terests and that the trial court limited the right of access only under
"the most extraordinary circumstances?"' The Second Circuit there-
fore limited the trial court's discretion and set a standard that re-
quires compelling circumstances to overcome the presumption in fa-
vor of access. 129 Applying this standard, the court determined that the
risk to the fair-trial right of the Myers defendants and others facing
trial in the Abscam operations was speculative. 127 Potential jurors, the
court noted, are likely not as aware of the news as the defendants and
media think they are, and defendants can rely on voir dire to excuse
potentially partial jurors. 129 The possible threat to the defendants'
right to a fair trial was therefore not a sufficiently compelling reason
to hinder the media's right of access to the videotapes." 9
B. Lowering the Standard to Overcome Access
In contrast to Myers, the Fifth Circuit determined in 1981, in Belo,
that a variety of factors could overcome the relatively weak presump-
tion in favor of the common-law right of access.'" The Fifth Circuit
held that the district judge did not abuse his discretion in denying
access based on potential prejudice to the future defendant's fair-trial
right." 1 The audiotapes in question in Belo were recordings of conver-
sations between FBI operatives in a sting operation (the "Brilab" in-
vestigation) and the defendants." 2 The defendants were public
officials charged with bribery in awarding state employee insurance
contracts." The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas
123 M. at 950.
124 See Myers, 635 F.2d at 950, 953-54 (evaluating competing concerns in affirming trial
court's decision); see also United States v. Salerno (In re CBS, Inc.), 828 F.2d 958, 960 (2d
Cu.r 1987) (access determination is 'committed to the trial court's discretion," but that
discretion is limited by the strength of the presumption of public access").
125 See Myers, 635 F.2d at 952.
126 See id.; see also Salerno, 828 F.2d at 960-61 (holding that the privacy rights of a wit-
ness did not outweigh the presumption in favor of the media's right of access to a video-
taped deposition).
127 635 F.2d at 959.
126 Id. at 953.
128 Id. at 954.
136 Belo, 654 F.2d at 434.
151 Id.
152
	 at 425.
13' Id.
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denied two broadcasting stations' requests to copy the audiotapes. 134
Broadcast of the tapes, the trial court held, would prejudice a future
defendant's right to a fair trial and obstruct the court's selection of an
impartial jury.'"
The Fifth Circuit rejected the broadcasters' argument that the
right of physical access to the tapes derived from the First Amend-
ment, noting that the Supreme Court in Warner Communications re-
jected a constitutional right to copy. 136 The Fifth Circuit determined
that, under Warner Communications, the media enjoys no right to in-
formation beyond the rights enjoyed by the public, and that the Con-
stitution does not grant the media or the public the right of physical
access to judicial records.'"
According to the court's reading of Warner Communications, a fed-
eral court of appeals reviews the trial court decision solely for abuse of
discretion.'" The Fifth Circuit recognized that. a court could interpret
ambiguous language in Warner Communications as granting the federal
court of appeals the right to balance the interests advanced by the
parties in a right-of-access case. 139 Nevertheless the Fifth Circuit stated
that federal appellate courts should only reverse a decision if the trial
court has flagrantly abused its discretion. 14°
The trial court judge, the Fifth Circuit held, did not abuse his
discretion when he denied physical access to the tapes."' Although
the possibility of prejudice to a future defendant's fair-trial right may
have been speculative, the court decided that federal appellate courts
should defer to a trial judge's decision to protect a defendant's fair-
trial right.' 42 The court additionally emphasized the diminished im-
portance of the common-law right of access in relation to the defen-
dant's constitutionally guaranteed fair-trial right. 143
194 Id.
135
 Belo, 654 F.2d at 425.
' 26 Id. at 426-27.
137
 Id. at 428-29.
139 Id. at 430-31.
132 Id. at 430 & th15 (citing Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 602 ("At this point, we
normally would be faced with the task of weighing the interests advanced by the parties in
light of the public interest and the duty of the courts."); id. at 603 ("We need not decide
how the balance would be struck if the case were resolved only on the basis of the facts and
the arguments reviewed above.")).
' 4° Bdo, 654 F.2d at 431.
141 Id.
112
 Id.; see William J. Whelan, III, Note, Copying and Broadcasting Video and Audio Tape
Evidence: A Threat to the Fair Trial Right, 50 FORDI1AM L. REV, 551, 578 (1982).
143 See Belo, 654 F.2d at 432.
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The court also addressed the strength of the media's common-
law right of access to the audiotapes. 144 Warner Communications, the
Fifth Circuit noted, did not support other holdings from federal ap-
pellate courts that a strong presumption exists in favor of the media's
common-law right of physical access. 145 Other federal courts of ap-
peals, in requiring a party to prove compelling circumstances to op-
pose the media's right of access, elevated the right of access to a level
reserved for constitutional rights.m Conversely, the Fifth Circuit read
Warner Communications as noting that various factors limit the right of
access. 147 In upholding the trial court's denial of the media's request
for access to the tapes, the Fifth Circuit in Belo emphasized the com-
mon-law, rather than a constitutional, basis for the media's right of
physical access to judicial doctunents. 148
C. An Intermediate Standard: The Majority Approach
In 1981, the Third Circuit, unlike the Fifth Circuit in Belo, ac-
cepted a strong prestunption in favor of the right of access in Cri-
den.. 145 The Third Circuit, however, did not place the stringent "com-
pelling circumstances" standard on those opposing access that the
Second Circuit articulated in Myers.150 In Criden, the Third Circuit
ruled on the media's right of access to videotaped evidence in an-
other prosecution of public officials in the Abscam operation.'" The
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Criden
released transcripts of the videotapes to the media but held that the
circumstances of the case were "sufficiently extraordinary" to deny the
media's request to copy the tapes. 152 The trial court also rejected the
Second Circuit's broad view of the strength of the right of access, not-
ing Warner Communications. 153
The Third Circuit decided that federal appellate courts should
not limit their review of right-of-access decisions to abuse of discre-
tion.'" Federal courts of appeals must also consider a trial court's
144
 See id. at 434.
'45 Id. at 433-34.
146 Id, at 434.
147 Id.
148 See 654 F.2d at 432, 434.
149 See Criden, 648 F.2d at 823.
15° Sec id.
151 Id, at 815.
152
 Id. at 816.
ms
164 See Cridcn. 648 F.2d at 818.
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evaluation and balancing of competing interests. 155 The Third Circuit
extensively reviewed the justifications for varying levels of trial court
discretion. 15° The reason the law places the decision within the discre-
tion of the trial court, the Third Circuit noted, influences the scope of
review 157
 For example, the law insulates trial courts from appellate
review when a trial court's decision is based on first-hand observa-
tion. 158
 Trial courts, however, may also retain discretion for pragmatic
reasons, because, for example, federal courts of appeals have not yet
developed guidelines on an emerging issue. 159 The Third Circuit rea-
soned that it could conduct a broader review of the weight and rele-
vance of the factors contemplated by the trial court because the trial
court's decision regarding access to the tapes was not based on first-
hand observations. 160
 The Third Circuit then evaluated the factors
favoring release of the tapes, focusing on the strength of the media's
right to inspect and copy judicial records. 161
Additionally, the court compared the common-law right of access
with the First Amendment right to attend trial, which the Supreme
Court recognized in 1980 in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia. 162
Although the Third Circuit did not determine if the First Amendment
applied to the right of access in question, the court stated that the
policy considerations in Richmond supported a strong presumption in
favor of the right to copy and inspect judicial documents. 163 The
Third Circuit reasoned that dissemination of the information pre-
sented at trial to those unable to attend "would serve the same values
of 'community catharsis,' observation of the criminal trial process,
and public awareness served by the open trial guarantee."Im The in-
155 Id.
155 See id. at 817-18.
157 Id. at 817.
158 M at 817-18.
159 Criden, 698 F.2d at 818.
15° id.
161
 Id at 819.
'62 See Richmond, 948 U.S. 555,580 (1980); Criden, 648 F.2d at 820.
185 Cdden, 648 F.2d at 821-22. For commentary comparing the right of access to First
Amendment rights, see Moliere, supra note 79, at 165 (contending that the common-law
right of access should be accorded significance comparable to First Amendment rights
because both rights protect the same democratic values); Starczewski, supra note 41, at
208-12 (arguing that even if the right of access does not rise to a constitutional level, pol-
icy considerations similar to those supporting a right to attend trial should lead to a stan-
dard that enables the media to access judicial records).
164 Crider, 648 F.2d at 822.
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volvement of public officials enhanced the public interest in viewing
the proceedings) 65
The common-law right of access, the Third Circuit concluded,
creates a strong presumption in favor of access. 166 If there is a public
interest in access to trial events, the presumption favoring access be-
comes "undeniable." 167 Therefore, the Third Circuit held that the
trial court in Criden erroneously minimized the strength of the public-
access and education benefits of releasing the tapes)° 8 Publication or
rebroadcast of the copies, the court noted, contributes to the public's
comprehension of judicial proceedings. 169 This publicity would not
further punish the defendants or invade their privacy because the
media had already widely publicized the defendants' actions)" The
Third Circuit also determined that the threat to the fair-trial right of
the defendant was conjectural."' If publicity could prejudice a defen-
dant, courts should rely on voir dire to reveal potentially partial ju-
rors. 172
In a concurring and dissenting opinion, Judge Joseph Weis
evaluated the majority's standard for the burden of proof needed to
overcome the presumption in favor of the right of access.'" Weis
characterized this standard as less stringent than "the most extraordi-
nary circumstances" burden the Second Circuit articulated in Myers, 174
Judge Weis also remarked that the court failed to set clear guidelines
for access determinations.'" The court, according to Judge Weis,
should have explained that the presumption favoring the right of ac-
cess is a factor to be balanced, rather than classifying the strength of
the presumption)"
Similar to the Third Circuit's decision in Criden, in 1986 the
Ninth Circuit, in Valley, followed a middle ground between the Second
Circuit in Myers, favoring access, and the Fifth Circuit in Belo, oppos-
166 Id.
166 See id. at 823.
167 Id.
I 65 Id. at 829.
leo Criden, 648 F.2d at 824.
175 Id. at 825.
171 Id, at 827.
172
 See id. at 828.
172 Sec id. at 830-31 (Weis, J., concurring and dissenting).
174 Criden, 648 F.2d at 830 (Weis, J., concurring and dissenting).
' 75 See id. at 830-31 (Weis, J., concurring and dissenting).
176 Id. at 831 (Weis, J., concurring and dissenting).
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ing access. 177 After reviewing the Supreme Court and federal courts of
appeals precedents, the Ninth Circuit followed Criden and required
less-than-compelling circumstances to overcome the strong presump-
tion in favor of the right of access. 178 In Valley, a television station re-
quested video- and audiotapes admitted into evidence in a trial for
RICO conspiracies. 179 The Ninth Circuit reversed the trial court's de-
nial of the media's request, ordering the trial court to grant the media
access to the tapes as long as the media provided the technology and
funding necessary to duplicate the tapes. 18°
The Ninth Circuit first characterized the nature of the right to
physical access. 181
 The right to copy and inspect evidence, the court
noted, is distinct from the public's constitutional right to attend
tria1. 182 The trial court had provided the media with access to the pro-
ceedings and transcripts of the taped evidence, therefore satisfying
the media's constitutional right to attend the tria1. 185 Whereas the
right to copy advances interests similar to those protected by the First
Amendment, such as monitoring public officials and institutions, the
Ninth Circuit believed that such a common-law right should not re-
ceive the same deference as a constitutional right.'
The Ninth Circuit then reviewed binding and persuasive author-
ity on the media's right of physical access. 185 Because the Supreme
Court had not squarely addressed the right to copy and inspect judi-
cial documents, the Ninth Circuit examined rulings of other federal
courts of appeals on the inatter. 186 The Ninth Circuit noted that the
Fifth Circuit in Bela and the Second Circuit in Myers both adopted
standards that contained "built-in biases," which either favored or op-
posed access. 187
177 See Willey, 798 F.2d at 1294. For another case in which a court found this middle
ground, see United States v. Edwards (In re Video-Indiana, Inc.), 672 F.2d 1289,1299 (7th
Cir. 1982) (finding that a court may deny access "only on the basis of articulable facts
known to the court, not on the basis of unsupported hypothesis or conjecture").
178
 See Valley, 798 F.2d at 1299.
178 Id. at 1290.
la° Id. at 1297.
181 See id. at 1292-94.
182
 Id. at 1293.
183 Valley, 798 F.2d at 1292-93.
184 See id. at 1293-94.
188 See id. at 1292-94.
186 See id.
187 Id. at 1293.
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The Ninth Circuit placed the holdings of the federal courts of
appeals along a spectrum) At one end is the Second Circuit's "com-
pelling circumstances" test from Myers, favoring access and creating
rigorous standards that those challenging access to reproducible ma-
terials must overcome."39 The Ninth Circuit noted that this standard
provided protections for the common-law right of access comparable
to those provided for constitutional rights)" The Ninth Circuit de-
clined to adopt this standard, however, stating that the Supreme
Court in Warner Communications delineated distinct levels of protec-
tion for the common-law right of access and First Amendment
rights. 191 At the other end of the spectrum from Myers is the Fifth Cir-
cuit's Belo decision, which allows even speculative. challenges to a de-
fendant's fair-trial right to overcome the media's right of access) 92
The Ninth Circuit stated that the Fifth Circuit decision did not follow
the Warner Communications dicta that supported a presumption favor-
ing access. 193
Three federal appellate courts, including the Third Circuit in
Criden, adopted standards in the middle of the spectrum, between the
Myers and Belo holdings, 194 These courts found a strong presumption
in favor of access but required opponents of access to articulate rea-
sonable facts, rather than requiring compelling circumstances, to de-
feat that preSumption, 195 The Ninth Circuit embraced this majority,
middle-ground approach, citing the Supreme Court's direction in
Warner Communications that a trial court should evaluate "'the interests
advanced by the parties in the light of the public interest and the ditty
of the courts." 06 In balancing these interests, the Ninth Circuit stated
that courts should look at. factors favoring access, such as the public
interest in understanding the proceedings, and factors countering the
right of access, such as the likelihood of improper uses. 197
Under the middle-ground standard, the Ninth Circuit in Valley
then analyzed and overturned the trial court's denial of media access
'BB Sec Valley, 798 F.2d at 1293.
189 See id.
199 Id. at 1293-94.
191 Sec id.
192 See id. at 1294.
193 Valley, 798 F.2d at 1294.
IN See id. at 1293.
195 Id.
196 Id. at 1294 (quoting Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 602).
197 Id.
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to the audio- and videotapes. 198 The Ninth Circuit briefly stated that
the standard of review when a trial court denies access is abuse of dis-
cretion. 1" The court, however, held that a trial court must articulate
specific facts supporting a denial of access, and may not just speculate
as to harm to a defendant's fair-trial right. 200
In rejecting the media's requests, the trial court had considered
inconvenience to the court, the risk of loss of the tapes, the probable
difficulty in finding impartial jurors in upcoming trials, and the possi-
bility that current jurors would ignore the court's warnings to disre-
gard publicity."/ The Ninth Circuit held that under the facts of Valley,
these factors did not warrant denying the media access to the record-
ings. 202 The court first determined that the administrative inconven-
ience of copying the tapes did not justify restricting the media's right
of access to the judicial records 203
 The broadcaster and the court-
room clerk had developed a method of copying the tapes that did not
interfere with the courtroom proceedings. 204 The broadcaster would
pay- the costs of reproduction and provide the necessary personnel
and equipment.205
Although administrative inconvenience did not warrant the trial
court's denial of access, the Ninth Circuit noted that the lower court
could reject a request if there were a reasonable possibility that copy-
ing might destroy the materials. 06 Where this possibility exists, the
trial court should consider other ways to provide access. 207 The Ninth
Circuit also noted that certain administrative difficulties could justify
refusing access. 208 The determination, according to the Ninth Circuit,
is within the "sound discretion" of the trial court.209
 The trial court,
however, must explicitly state facts indicating an administrative incon-
venience that justifies denying access. 21 °
The Ninth Circuit noted the possibility of prejudice to future de-
fendants as the most substantial concern of the trial court in right-of-
198 See 798 F.2d at 1294-97.
193 Id. at 1294.
"0 Id. at 1295 (citing Edwards, 672 F.2d at 1294) (quotations omitted).
" I Id. at 1294-95.
202 Id. at 1295.
288 Valley, 798 F.2d at 1295.
991 Id.
998 Id.
206 id,
207 Id.
298 Valley, 798 F.2d at 1295.
299 Id.
210 Id.
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access cases.211 This concern, however, was either hypothesis or con-
jecture, and therefore was not an "articulable" basis for rejecting the
media's request for access. 212 An articulable basis, in which a court
articulates facts for its decision, would be a trial court's actual prob-
lems with jury selection and a showing, through a review of each ex-
hibit in question, of which materials would relate to future trials. 2"
The Ninth Circuit in Valley held that articulable facts existed to war-
rant. denial of access to one of the tapes, because of the difficulties in
jury selection in the prior trial and the direct references on the tape
to a future defendant.214 The Ninth Circuit, however, directed the
lower court to grant access to the remaining requested tapes. 215
D. Recent Case Law: Ease of Reproduction
In 2002, in In re Providence Journal Co., the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit held that the right of access encompasses "'mate-
rials on which a court relies in determining the litigants' substantive
rights.'"21° Providence Journal added a new wrinkle to the still unre-
solved debate over the strength of the presumption of the media's
right to inspect, and copy public records by affirming a denial of ac-
cess based solely on administrative inconvenience. 2t 7 The court, how-
ever, did not articulate a standard for evaluating media requests to
inspect and copy judicial records. 2" Instead, the First Circuit left the
decision to the discretion of trial courts to determine on a case by
case basis.219
In Providence Journal, the media had requested to copy evidence
from the April 2002 trial of Providence Mayor Vincent "Buddy" Cianci
and other public officials, who were tried on a variety of racketeering
charges. 220 During the trial, the government played excerpts from
seventy-one video- and audiotapes of secretly recorded conversations
involving the defendants. 221 The government used a software program
to present the excerpts, through which it introduced selected por-
2" Id.
212 See id. at 1295-96.
212 Valley, 798 F.2d at 1296.
214 Id.
215 Id. at 1297.
21° 293 F.3d at 16 (quoting Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1,13 (1st Cir. 1986)).
217 See id. at 17.
21° See id. at 16-19.
219 See id. at 17.
220 Id. at 5.
221 ProuldenceJournal, 293 F.3d at 7-8.
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Lions of the conversations into evidence. 222 The prosecutor played
these excerpts using the software and simultaneously broadcast them
to video monitors in the courtroom and an overflow room. 223 A tran-
script scrolled across the monitor screen on which the excerpts
played.224
 •
The Providence Journal newspaper ("The Journal"') ,petitioned the
trial court for access to, and copies of, these video and audio exhib-
its.225 The Journal based this petition in part on the public's common-
law right of access to judicial proceedings.226 The trial court refused,
stating that the form in which the prosecutor presented the evidence
made it difficult to replicate the excerpts played for the jury. 227 The
First Circuit upheld the trial court's decision and determined that
permitting the media and public to observe, but not copy, the soft-
ware satisfied the common-law right of access. 228 The court exercised
only limited review, stating that the decision is best left to the "in-
formed discretion of the trial court" in light of the particular facts and
circumstances involved.229
 The First Circuit held that the lower court
had not abused its discretion. 23° The First Circuit therefore affirmed
the lower court's determination that the right of access did not re-
quire the lower court to create a new recording that consisted only of
the evidence played in court. 231
The Journal also contended that it could record the excerpts while
the government presented them in court. 232 The clerk for the trial
court, however, stated that the courthouse's technical staff and the
vendors of the courtroom technology agreed that it would not be
practicable to record the audio or video presentation in court. 233 The
Journal argued that a feasible method existed to copy the tapes, but
the First Circuit declined to consider this argument because The Jour-
nal had not submitted it to the trial court. 234
222 Id. at 8.
223 Id.
224 Id.
225 Id.
228 Sec Providence Journal, 293 F.3d at 16.
227 Id. at 17.
228 See id. at 17-18.
229 See id. at 17.
228
 Id. at 18.
231 See Providence Journal, 293 F.3d at 17-18.
492 Id. at 18.
233
234 Id.
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IV. ANALYSIS: CREATING A UNIFORM STANDARD
FOR ACCESS DECISIONS
,re Providence Journal Co. is a reminder that twenty-five years af-
ter the U.S. Supreme Court first addressed the media right of access
in Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., the standard for evaluating a
right-of-access claim remains unsettled. 235 Because the Supreme Court
decided Warner Communications on statutory grounds, its extended
dicta on the common-law right of access is persuasive rattier than
binding authority. 236 After Warner Communications, the federal courts
of appeals were free to craft their own standards for assessing lower
courts' decisions in right-of-access disputes. 237
 The interpretations of
Warner Communications in the federal courts of appeals varied widely,
which led to conflicting evaluations of the standard of review of a trial
court's access decision and of the strength of the presumption favor-
ing access."'
An abuse-of-discretion standard of review may be insufficiently
exacting to protect the important common-law right that a request to
copy implicates. 239 Therefore, under the appropriate standard of re-
view of an access decision, a federal court of appeals should evaluate
the factors the trial court considered and the weight the trial court
accorded those factors.") In evaluating the presumption in favor of
access, a trial court should accord varying degrees of importance to
competing interests, depending on the nature of the interest," This
Standard addresses constitutional concerns by requiring trial courts,
in denying media access, to articulate facts demonstrating a reason-
able threat to a constitutional right such as a defendant's right to a
fair tria1.242 This standard also addresses the relative significance of
administrative concerns by requiring a trial court to articulate com-
pelling circumstances that justify denying access.243
 The standard rec-
233 See In re Providence Journal Co., 293 F.3d 1, 9, 16-18 (1st Cir. 2002).
238 See 435 U.S. 589, 602-03 (1978).
237 Id.; see United States v. Myers (In re Nat'l Broad. Co.), 635 F.2d 945, 950 (2d Cir.
1980) (finding that the "most pertinent precedent considering" the media's right of access
was the D.C. Circuit's decision in United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252 (D.C. Cir. 1976)).
238 See supra notes 97-234 and accompanying text.
238 Sec Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 598-99; United States v. Criden (In re Nat'l
Broad. Co.), 648 F.2d 814, 818-19 (3d Cir. 1981).
248 See Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 602; Criden, 648 F.2d at 818-19.
241 See infra notes 267-315 and accompanying text.
242 See infra notes 268-281 and accompanying text.
243 See infra notes 282415 and accompanying text.
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ognizes that administrative concerns do not rise to a constitutional
level and thus are not as important as constitutional rights. 244
A. Scope of Review
The Supreme Court's ambiguous statement in Warner Communica-
tions that the decision "is one best left to the sound discretion of the
trial court ... to be exercised in light of the relevant facts and circum-
stances of the particular case" has caused federal courts of appeals to
diverge sharply in the scope of review they apply to a trial court's deci-
sion on media access to judicial records. 245 In United States v. Criden (In
re National Broadcasting Co.), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit held that federal appellate courts should review a lower court's
decision on rights of access and balancing of the factors involved un-
der heightened scrutiny because the decision does not depend on
trial court observations. 246 In contrast, in Belo Broadcasting Corp. u
Clark, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit determined that
federal appellate courts should only review lower courts' right-of-
access decisions for abuse of discretion. 247 Considering the nature of
right-of-access decisions and the policy considerations supporting
more exacting review, the Third Circuit's heightened scrutiny is more
appropriate. 248
The Third and Fifth Circuits adopted their respective standards
of review based on different determinations of the nature of a trial
court's decision.242
 The Third Circuit thoughtfully analyzed the rea-
sons for various levels of review and determined that a trial court's
proximity to and direct observation of trial proceedings do not pro-
vide it with a "superior vantage point" over the federal court of ap-
peals. 250
 In contrast, the Fifth Circuit held that the access decision
does depend on a trial judge's direct observations because it impli-
cates concerns for judicial efficiency and a defendant's right to a fair
tria1.251
 Neither the Third nor Fifth Circuit, however, fully explained
2" See infra notes 282-315 and accompanying text.
245 See 435 U.S. at 599; supra notes 83-85,123-125,138-140 and accompanying text.
248 See Crider:, 648 F.2d at 818-19.
247 See 654 F.2d 423,431 (5th Cir. 1981).
248 Sec Crider:, 648 F.2d at 817-19.
249 See Belo, 654 F.2d at 431 n.18; Crider:, 648 F.2d at 818.
25° See Crider, 648 F.2d at 817-18.
251 See Belo, 654 F.2d at 43111.18.
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its finding that a right-of-access decision is or is not based on first-
hand observation. 252
Although not well-supported, the Third Circuit's determination
that a trial judge's observations are not crucial to evaluating an access
decision is still compelling.258 The trial judge's direct observation of
the trial does not provide the trial court with a vantage point superior
to that of a federal court of appeals with a full record of the trial
judge's finclings. 254 As the Fifth Circuit noted, the trial judge is in a
position to gauge the effect of access on the efficiency of trial pro-
ceedings, as well as the impact of broadcasting released evidence on
finding impartial jurors. 255 Nevertheless, the trial court could convey
this information to the federal court of appeals in a detailed decision,
articulating the reasons for the trial court's grant or denial of ac-
cess. 25°
Policy considerations also support the Third Circuit's more exact-
ing standard of review.257 Although trial court discretion has the ad-
vantage of flexibility, it is subject to various disadvantages. 258 Inconsis-
tency of decisions, a lack of predictability?, and the deprivation of a
litigant's opportunity for review weigh against trial court discretion. 259
Additionally, as the Third Circuit stated in Cliden, the heightened
standard of review requiring the trial court to articulate clearly the
basis for its decision would benefit the trial court. 260 With no clear re-
cord of the basis for a trial court's decision, a federal court of appeals
may exercise its judgment in place of the trial court's. 261 Alternatively,
with a clear record, the federal court of appeals could only review the
factors the trial court considered and weighed. 262
The access decision, however, uniquely involves the trial court
because it implicates concerns for efficiency of the trial court's pro-
ceedings, as the Fifth Circuit noted. 265 The determination also impli-
cates the court's records and files, over which the court has supervi-
252 See Belo, 654 F.2d at 431 n.18; Criden, 648 F.2c1 at 818.
253 See Criden, 648 F.2(1 at 818-19.
254
 See id. at 818.
255 See Belo, 654 F.2d at 43111.18.
255 See Criden, 648 F.2d at 818-19.
257 See id. at 818.
258 Id.
259 Id.
260 Sec id. at 819.
261 See Criden, 648 F.2d at 819.
252 See id.
265
 See Belo, 654 F.2d at 431 n.18.
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sory authority. 2" The court has an interest in preventing use of its re-
cords for improper means, such as in the promotion of scanda1. 265
The trial court's heightened interest in the determination, however,
favors a broader scope of review because the federal court of appeals
could monitor a trial court's interest in its decision to ensure the trial
court does not give that interest undue weight in light of competing
concerns.266
B. Strength of the Presumption: A Proposal far Weighing Competing Concerns
Courts have weighed constitutional concerns and administrative
inconvenience, such as the difficulty and expense of reproducing evi-
dence, against the uncertain presumption in favor of access. 267 The
standards for the two interests should differ when weighed against the
presumption favoring access because administrative difficulties do not
demand the weight that courts must afford a defendant's constitu-
tional rights. 255
1. Constitutional Concerns
When there is an articulated threat to a defendant's constitu-
tional right to a fair trial, courts should adopt the middle-ground
standard that the Third and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals estab-
lished. 269
 These courts emphasized that the strong presumption in
favor of access must yield to reasonable concerns for the defendant's
right to a fair tria1.270
 This standard recognizes the significance of the
common-law right of access but requires less-than-compelling circum-
stances to overcome the presumption in favor of access. 271
This test is less stringent than the approach of the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals in United States v. Myers (In re National Broadcasting
Co.), which provides that "only the most compelling circumstances"
warrant denying access. 272
 Policy considerations such as the impor-
tance of transparency in judicial proceedings, considerations similar
to rights the First Amendment protects, support this strong presump-
214
 See Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 598.
265 Id.
266 See id.; Criden, 648 F.2d at 819.
267 See supra notes 126-129,201-215,225-234 and accompanying text.
265 See supra notes 126-129,201-215,225-234 and accompanying text.
269 See supra notes 149-215 and accompanying text.
275 See supra notes 149-215 and accompanying text.
271 See supra notes 149-215 and accompanying text.
272 Sec 635 F.2d at 952.
2003]	 The Media's Right to copy Judicial Records	 1289
don in favor of access.273 The court in Myers recognized these policy
concerns.274 Other federal courts of appeals, however, have criticized
Myers for elevating the common-law right of access to a level of protec-
tion only afforded constitutional rights. 275 The Third and Ninth Cir-
cuits' middle-ground approach avoids this problem and recognizes
the limitations of the common-law right of access. 276 A trial court, un-
der this standard, could deny the media's request for access if the
court articulated reasonable, but not hypothetical, concerns about a
threat to a defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial. 277
The middle-ground approach also recognizes the significant pol-
icy concerns supporting the common-law right that the Fifth Circuit
gave relatively little weight to in Be/o.278 The court in Belo held that the
presumption in favor of access is merely one factor for courts to con-
skier in balancing competing interests. 279 The court stated that fed-
eral appellate courts should defer to the discretion of the trial court
and not assess the relative weight it accorded the interests involved. 28°
The middle-ground standard for weighing the right of access against
constitutional concerns would allow a federal court of appeals to ex-
ercise more exacting discretion in reviewing the factors that the trial
court considered and weighed. 28 i
2. Administrative Concerns
In contrast, when reviewing a denial of access on the basis of ad-
ministrative considerations, federal appellate courts should require
the trial court to articulate compelling circumstances justifying de-
nial.282
 When faced with competing administrative concerns, the court
2" See Valley Broad. Co. v. United States Dist. Court for the Dist. of Nev., 798 F.2d 1289,
1293 (9th Cir. 1986); Myers, 635 F.2d at 951-52; Moliere, supra note 79, at 189; Starczewski,
supra note 41, at 211-12.
274 See 635 F.2d at 952.
275 See, e.g., Valley, 798 F.2d at 1293; see also Whelan, supra note 142, at 573.
276 See Valley, 798 F.2d at 1293-94; Foster, supra note 49, at 130-31.
277 See Foster, supra note 49, at 130-31 (advocating Valley standard "recognizing a
strong presumption in favor of granting media requests, but allowing an avenue for the
defendant's constitutional fair trial right to override it").
278 See Belo, 654 F.2d at 431-32; Criden, 648 F.2d at 822 (discussing policy behind right
of access).
279
	 F.2d at 434.
288 See id.
281 Sec Criden, 648 F.2d at 818.
282 See Myers, 635 F.2d at 952. Prior to Providence Journal, federal courts of appeals rarely
mentioned or weighed judicial efficiency that was implicated by administrative inconven-
ience, such as difficulty reproducing evidence. See supra notes 97-215 and accompanying
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should accord significant weight to the presumption in favor of ac-
cess.283 Administrative concerns only warrant limiting the right of ac-
cess under compelling circumstances, such as a reasonable chance
that the evidence would be lost or destroyed. 284 If there is a legitimate
threat of damaging the evidence, the trial court should try to find an
alternative method of copying it. 286 The trial court must articulate
compelling circumstances that warrant denying access. 286 This stan-
dard requires the trial court to explicitly delineate administrative
burdens that are compelling enough to prevent access, but also rec-
ognizes that administrative difficulties could, under limited circum-
stances, impede reproduction and access to judicial records. 287
The strength of the presumption favoring access would resemble
that which the Second Circuit articulated in Myers. 288 The Second Cir-
cuit, however, would weigh the presumption in favor of access uni-
formly, regardless of competing interests. 289 The presumption should
only be at its strongest, at the level the Second Circuit delineated in
Myers, when countered by interests such as administrative concerns
that do not rise to a constitutional level. 29° When evidence is in a form
that enables copying without a significant risk of damaging the evi-
dence or interfering with trial, only the most compelling circum-
stances should justify denying access based on administrative con-
cerns. 291
In Providence journal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Cir-
cuit should therefore have required the trial court to demonstrate
that the administrative difficulties were compelling enough to warrant
denying access. 292 The materials the prosecutor presented in court in
Providence Journal were spliced and stored on a laptop computer and
did not exist as a single document; therefore, reproduction would re-
quire the creation of a new recording. 293 The trial court found that
text (courts of appeals' considerations of competing concerns). The Ninth Circuit in Palley
and the Second Circuit in Myers are the only federal courts of appeals to have addressed
administrative difficulties in any detail. See l'allty, 798 F.2d at 1295; Myers, 635 F.2d at 952.
288 See Valley, 798 F.2d at 1295.
384 Sce id.; Myers, 635 F.2d at 952.
283 See Valley, 798 F.2d at 1295.
286 See Myers, 635 F.2d at 952.
287 See id.
288
 See id.
2a8 Sce id.
28° See id.
231 See Myers, 635 F.2d at 952.
292
 See Providence fourna4 293 F.3d at 17; Myers, 635 F.2d at 952.
233 293 F.3d at 17.
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creating a new recording was a "daunting task."294 The First Circuit
deferred to the trial court's determination and held that these mate-
rials could not be readily reproduced. 295 Rather than applying an
abuse-of-discretion standard of review, the First Circuit should have
examined the factors that the trial court considered, and the weight it
gave those factors, to determine if the administrative difficulties cre-
ated compelling circumstances. 296 A sparse record on the feasibility of
reproduction made heightened scrutiny of the lower court's decision
difficult. 297 The First Circuit, however, could have remanded the case
and required the trial court to articulate technical or other difficulties
that created circumstances sufficiently compelling to deny access. 298
In addition, the First Circuit erroneously relied on the Second
Circuit's statement in Myers that the compelling-circumstances stan-
dard only applies to evidence that is "'in a form that readily permits
sight and sound reproduction.'"299 Practical concerns, according to
the First Circuit, thus "invariably" limit the public's right to copy
documents to materials that are easily reproduced."° The First Cir-
cuit, however, in relying on Myers, failed to address the Second Cir-
cuit's statements later in Myers; those statements implied that a form
that readily permits copying is one that does not unduly burden the
trial proceedings or damage the evidence."'
Because of the scantiness of the record, it is unclear how readily
the media could have reproduced the materials in Providence Jour-
nal.302 At a minimum, however, the First Circuit should have required
the trial court to present carefully articulated findings that copying
would have damaged the evidence or interfered with the "orderly
294 Id,
2513 See id.
295 See supra notes 245-266 and accompanying text.
297 See Pmvidence Journal, 293 F.3d at 17. There was conflicting information about the
difficulty of reproducing the material and no information about the software that created
the evidence on the record. Id. Additionally, The Providence journal proposed a technically
practical and unobtrusive method of recording the material as it was played in open court.
Id. at 18. The First Circuit could not consider this contention, however, because the Provi-
denceJournal did not submit it to the trial court. Id.
298 See Valley, 798 F.2d at 1295 (finding that the district court nmst delineate the facts
creating an administrative burden warranting denying access and "should have given little,
if any, weight to its administrative burdens"); Myets, 625 F.2d at 952.
299 ProvidenceJournal, 293 F.3d at 17 (quoting Myers, 635 F.2d at 952).
3" Id. -
301 See id.; Myers, 635 F.2d at 952.
"2 293 F.3d at 17.
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conduct" of the proceedings." 3 Because the interests competing with
the presumption in favor of access did not implicate constitutional
concerns, the court should have required the lower court to demon-
strate that the administrative difficulties created compelling circum-
stances before interfering with the media's common-law right of ac-
cess to the judicial records."4
Prior to Providence Journal, the federal appellate courts primarily
upheld denials of access based on the risk of prejudice to the defen-
dant's constitutional right to a fair trial. 5D5 Providence Journal, however,
added a new element to the debate by affirming a trial court decision
that denied access solely because of administrative inconvenience. 306
The First Circuit should have recognized that administrative concerns
are not as significant as constitutional interests and applied the stan-
dard of review the Second Circuit articulated in Myers.307
 That stan-
dard requires the lower court to demonstrate that the administrative
burden in question creates circumstances compelling enough to jus-
tify restricting access 3 06
As courtroom technology advances, it is likely that the media, in
attempting to copy evidence pursuant to the public's common-law
right of access, will continue to encounter administrative difficulties
similar to those in Providence Journal. 909 A trial court such as the dis-
trict court in Providence Journal faces a heightened interest in a case if
copying involves administrative difficulties. 30
 A federal court of ap-
peals, as a disinterested party, should therefore require the trial court
to articulate compelling circumstances that warrant denying access
based solely on administrative concerns. 3" This requirement could
insure that a trial court does not give too much weight to concerns
3°3 See id. at 17-18; Valley, 798 F.2d at 1295; Myers, 635 F.2d at 952 (applying "compel-
ling circumstances" standard only to evidence that the media could copy "without any
significant risk of impairing the integrity of the evidence or interfering with the orderly
conduct of the trial").
334 Sec Myers, 635 F.2d at 952; see also Valley, 798 F.2(1 at 1295 (stating that in light of the
media's development of unobtrusive procedures and provision of equipment for copying,
"the district court should have given little, if any, weight to its administrative burdens in
this case").
30' See supra notes 126-129,141-143,211-215 and accompanying text.
3°°
	 F.3d at 17.
307 See Myers, 635 F.2d at 952.
3°3 See id.
" See 293 F.3d at 17.
310
 See id.
511 See Myers, 635 F.2d at 952.
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that its own resources would be taxed in reproducing the documents
in question.312
In addition to concerns that a trial court may not be objective
when considering administrative difficulties, a heightened standard
requiring compelling circumstances for denying access based on ad-
ministrative concerns recognizes that such concerns do not rise to a
constitutional leve1. 313 Courts should not afford administrative
difficulties the same deference as constitutional concerns. 314 A stan-
dard requiring a trial court to articulate compelling circumstances to
overcome access based on administrative concerns, and, in contrast,
only reasonable concerns to overcome access based on constitutional
rights, recognizes the diminished significance of administrative, in
comparison with constitutional, concerns. 315
CONCLUSION
English and American common law have long recognized the
public's right of access to judicial records. This right of access has pol-
icy considerations of openness similar to those the First Amendment
promotes. The Supreme Court has recognized the importance of this
right, but has yet to address the disagreement among the federal
courts of appeals regarding the standard for evaluating a lower court's
decision of whether to grant the public or media access to judicial re-
cords. A trial court does not uniquely base its access decision on first-
hand observations that it could not adequately convey on the record
to a federal court of appeals. Therefore, federal appellate courts
should not limit review to abuse of discretion. The federal court of
appeals should evaluate a lower court's balancing and determine if
the lower court appropriately weighed the competing interests in
making its decision.
Federal courts of appeals have also disagreed on the strength of
the presumption in favor of the common-law right of access. They
have uniformly failed to recognize that the relative strength of the
presumption depends on the competing interest involved. The pre-
sumption in favor of access should yield more readily to constitutional
concerns such as a defendant's right to a fair trial, as implicated by
312
 See id.
315 Sec Valley, 798 F.2d at 1295 (finding that administrative considerations did not war-
rant restricting the right to copy); Myers, 635 F.2d at 952.
514 See Valley, 798 F.2d at 1295.
515 See Myers, 635 F.2d at 952.
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the effect of the publicity on jurors. Legitimate constitutional con-
cerns would therefore trump the common-law right of access. When
the competing concerns, such as administrative inconvenience, do
not rise to a constitutional level, the presumption in favor of the
common-law right of access should be more difficult to overcome.
Federal appellate courts should require lower courts to articulate
compelling circumstances to justify a denial of access based on admin-
istrative inconvenience. This standard recognizes the well-settled
common-law right of access and protects that right from encroach-
ment based on technological or other administrative difficulties.
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